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1399 
CONFLICTING CONFRONTATION CLAUSE CONCERNS: THE 
ADMISSIBILITY OF HOSPITAL RECORDS VERSUS A 
DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
BRONX COUNTY  
People v. Diaz1 
(decided May 9, 2012) 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1977, a New York Supreme Court jury returned a guilty 
verdict against Enrique Diaz, finding him guilty of rape, kidnapping, 
and coercion in the first degree.2  Then, in 2011, Diaz brought a mo-
tion pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law section 440 
seeking to vacate the conviction.3  Diaz’s appeal asserted that he was 
deprived of his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights when the trial 
court allowed the state to introduce notations made by a hospital resi-
dent who did not testify.4  The defendant alleged that the hospital 
records, which included the notations, were testimonial in nature 
analogous to the forensic reports in the influential United States Su-
preme Court case, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.5  Diaz also con-
tended that the hospital report was prepared with the primary purpose 
of proving facts related to the prosecution of his alleged crime.6 
“On April 28, 1978, the Appellate Division, First Department, 
 
1 People v. Diaz, No. 02843-1975, 2012 WL 1606311, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012). 
2 Id. at *2. 
3 Id. at *3; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10 (allowing a defendant to file a motion seeking 
to vacate their judgment based on “[m]aterial evidence adduced by the people at a trial re-
sulting in the judgment was procured in violation of the defendant’s rights under the consti-
tution of this state or of the United States”). 
4 Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *1. 
5 Id. at *5.  See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 (2009) (holding cer-
tificates prepared by non-testifying laboratory analysts were testimonial statements, and the 
“analysts were ‘witnesses’ for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment”). 
6 Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *5. 
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. . . affirmed [Diaz’s] conviction without opinion.7  A year later, Diaz 
filed a habeas corpus petition in which the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed.8  In response, 
Diaz filed a 440 motion on Sixth Amendment grounds, which was al-
so subsequently denied.9  The court held that the hospital reports 
were non-testimonial and properly admitted under the state’s business 
records exception to hearsay.10 
New York precedent supports the notion that statements made 
by a patient to a physician are not testimonial as long as they are in 
response to a physician’s inquiry that has the primary objective of de-
termining the mechanism of injury, rendering a diagnosis, and admin-
istering medical treatment.11  Although the Supreme Court has yet to 
decide whether hospital records constitute testimonial evidence with-
in the scope of the Confrontation Clause, the Court has addressed 
both the testimonial nature of forensic laboratory reports as well as 
the relevance of statements made by an individual during the exist-
ence of an ongoing emergency.12  This note will discuss whether the 
Diaz opinion is consistent with New York’s approach in determining 
admissibility of hospital records based on their testimonial nature and 
the business records exception.  It will also examine the extent to 
which New York has adopted or departed from federal precedent.  
Lastly, this analysis will include a prediction of how the Supreme 
Court will decide on this issue. 
 
7 Id. at *3. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at *1. 
10  
Contrary to the Defendant’s contention, the hospital record in this case is 
not like the forensic report deemed testimonial by the Supreme Court in 
Melendez-Diaz, but rather, the record reflected occurrences and events 
that related to the diagnosis, prognosis and treatment of the complainant 
and was therefore properly admitted into evidence under the state’s busi-
ness records exception to the hearsay rule. 
Id. at *5 (citing People v. Ortega, 942 N.E.2d 210, 214 (2010)). 
11 Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *4 (citing People v. Duhs, 947 N.E.2d 617, 409 (N.Y. 
2011) (holding “where the primary purpose of a physician’s inquiry to a patient is to deter-
mine the mechanism in order to render a diagnosis and administer medical treatment, state-
ments made by the patient to the physician are not testimonial in nature”). 
12 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311; Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006). 
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II.  THE FACTS OF PEOPLE V. DIAZ  
Diaz was charged and convicted of kidnapping and raping a 
young female.13  At issue in the case was the testimony of Dr. Paul 
Fuchs.14  Dr. Fuchs was the complainant’s physician and a witness 
for the prosecution.15  At trial, Dr. Fuchs testified that the complain-
ant first sought his medical assistance at his office and that he contin-
ued to treat her after admitting her to the hospital.16  He attested to the 
hospital’s record of the complainant’s stay as well as his personal ex-
aminations.17  The hospital records included the notes and observa-
tions of the admitting physician at the hospital.18  According to Dr. 
Fuchs, he was required to read the notations of the admitting physi-
cian and if he believed them to be accurate, he was to sign the rec-
ord.19  Dr. Fuchs testified that he signed the record because he agreed 
with the report.20  In addition, Dr. Fuchs attested to the fact that the 
“hospital record was kept in the regular course of business.”21 
Counsel for the defense objected to Dr. Fuchs’s testimony 
based on two separate grounds.  First, the defense objected to Dr. 
Fuchs’s statement that the complainant “was suffering from ‘reactive 
anxiety depression and weight loss’ ” stemming from the assault 
committed by Diaz.22  The defense argued that his observations were 
unrelated and were assuming the jury’s role of assessing the credibil-
ity of the complaining witness.23  Second, Diaz’s counsel objected to 
the trial court’s admission of the hospital record and argued that parts 
of the record included injuries inflicted upon the complainant that 
were committed by a co-conspirator.24  The trial judge overruled both 
objections and allowed the hospital record to be admitted into evi-
 
13 Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *1. 
14 Id. at *2-3. 
15 Id. at *2. 
16 Id. at *5. 
17 Id. at *2 (referring to the testimony introduced by in which he “reviewed the record at 
trial to refresh his recollection of his own observations of the complainant”). 
18 Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *2. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at *5. 
22 Id. at *2. 
23 Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *2. 
24 Id. 
3
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dence.25 
In 1977, Diaz appealed his conviction claiming ineffective as-
sistance of counsel for failing to object to the admittance of the hospi-
tal records at trial.26  The Appellate Division, First department af-
firmed Diaz’s conviction on April 28, 1978.27  A year later, Diaz 
unsuccessfully sought habeas relief when the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed his petition.28  
Then in August of 2011, Diaz filed a CPL 440 motion to vacate his 
conviction, asserting that the admission of the complainant’s hospital 
record violated his Sixth Amendment constitutional right to confron-
tation.29  The Supreme Court of Bronx County denied Diaz’s motion 
holding that the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause 
were not violated because the hospital record was not testimonial in 
nature.30  Furthermore, the court ruled the hospital record was admis-
sible under New York’s business records exception to the hearsay 
rule.31 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
A.  Confrontation Clause 
The court’s denial of Diaz’s appeal began with a discussion of 
the federal approach towards confrontation issues in its analysis of 
Crawford v. Washington32 and its progeny.  The Sixth Amendment 
bestows upon the accused  “the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him.”33  In Crawford, the Supreme Court held that 
the Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of out-of-court 
statements that are testimonial in nature unless the declarant is una-
 
25 Id. at *2-3 (“Justice Rosenberg overruled the objections of the Defendant’s trial coun-
sel, with an instruction to the jury that they were not required to decide whether the com-
plainant had a condition or not; the doctor’s testimony related to the issue of the complain-
ant’s credibility.”). 
26 Id. at *3. 
27 Id. 
28 Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *3. 
29 Id. at *1, *3. 
30 Id. at *5. 
31 Id. 
32 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
33 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2713 (2011); U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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vailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine 
the declarant regarding the statements at issue.34  Crawford failed to 
provide a comprehensive definition of “testimonial,” but two years 
later in Davis v. Washington35 the Court established the “primary 
purpose” test as a means of determining whether statements are tes-
timonial or not.36  Under the “primary purpose” test, statements made 
with the primary purpose of proving facts or events in anticipation of 
a criminal trial are deemed testimonial in nature.37 
The court in Diaz applied the “primary purpose” test intro-
duced by Davis and held that the complainant’s hospital record was 
not testimonial because it was not prepared with the primary purpose 
of proving facts relevant to the prosecution of a crime.38  The court 
reasoned that the circumstances surrounding the time in which the 
complainant’s statements were made to the doctor did not suggest 
that the record was prepared in anticipation of proving facts relevant 
to the prosecution of Diaz.39 
B.  Business Record Exception 
The court deemed the hospital record non-testimonial because 
it reflected “occurrences and events related to the diagnosis, progno-
sis and treatment of the complainant.”40  As such, the records were 
admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.41  
Since business records are generally admissible when they are not 
deemed testimonial, Diaz’s Sixth Amendment rights were not violat-
 
34 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 (recognizing “[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent 
from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the 
defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine”). 
35 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
36 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (“We leave for another day any effort to spell out a compre-
hensive definition of “testimonial”); Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (holding “[statements] are testi-
monial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergen-
cy, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution”). 
37 Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
38 Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *5 (“In this case, the hospital record was not prepared with 
the primary purpose of proving facts relevant to the prosecution of a crime.”). 
39 Id. (“At trial, Dr. Fuchs testified that he was treating the complainant as a patient, that 
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The Diaz court also relied on several notable New York Court 
of Appeals cases in coming to the business record exception determi-
nation.  For example, the court found the statements made by the 
complainant to Dr. Fuchs were comparable to the statement admitted 
in People v. Ortega.43  In Ortega, the court held medical records to be 
admissible under the business records exception because of the rec-
ord’s reference to a safety plan and incidents of domestic violence, 
which were relevant to the victim’s treatment.44  Evidently the court 
in Diaz found that the complainant had suffered similar psychological 
and traumatic issues as the complainant in Ortega.45  Having been 
victims of domestic violence and rape, it is likely that they both en-
dured more than just physical wounds.46  The statements elicited from 
the complainant in Diaz, just like those from Ortega, were necessary 
in order to properly diagnose and treat her. 47 
In addition to Ortega, the court in Diaz referenced three other 
relevant New York decisions that admitted reports under the business 
records exception, despite the fact that the reports contained state-
 
42 Id. 
43 942 N.E.2d 210 (N.Y. 2010). 
44 Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *5 (citing Ortega, 942 N.E. 2d at 215 (holding “references 
to ‘domestic violence’ and to the existence of a safety plan were admissible under the busi-
ness records exception”)). 
Not only were these statements relevant to complainant’s diagnosis and 
treatment, domestic violence was part of the attending physician’s diag-
nosis in this case.  With all that has been learned about the scourge of 
domestic violence in recent decades, we now recognize that it differs 
materially, both as an offense and a diagnosis, from other types of as-
sault in its effect on the victim and in the resulting treatment.  In this 
context, a doctor faced with a victim who has been assaulted by an inti-
mate partner is not only concerned with bandaging wounds. In addition 
to physical injuries, a victim of domestic violence may have a whole 
host of other issues to confront, including psychological and trauma is-
sues that are appropriately part of medical treatment.  Developing a safe-
ty plan, including referral to a shelter where appropriate, and dispensing 
information about domestic violence and necessary social services can 
be an important part of the patient’s treatment.  Therefore, it was not er-
ror to admit references to domestic violence and a safety plan in com-
plainant's medical records. 
Id. 
45 Id. at *5. 
46 Ortega, 942 N.E. 2d at 212; Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *1. 
47 Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *5. 
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ments of non-testifying witnesses.48  First, in People v. Freycinet,49 
the Court of Appeals deemed the factual portions of an autopsy report 
to be non-testimonial and was properly introduced at trial under the 
business records exception, even though the doctor who prepared the 
report did not testify.50  Second, the Diaz opinion relied on People v. 
Hall51 where the First Department admitted an autopsy report under 
the business records exception without requiring the medical examin-
er who created the report to testify.52  Last, the court in Diaz rendered 
the holding in People v. Brown53 to be applicable in its analysis.  In 
Brown, a DNA report consisting of raw data produced by a machine 
was admissible under the business record exception, despite the fact 
that the analyst who compiled the report did not testify.54  Although 
the Diaz opinion does not explicitly mention the statements made by 
the complainant to Dr. Fuchs, the court found reason to believe that 
the record reflected information that was germane to administering 
the appropriate medical treatment and provided sufficient New York 
precedent to support its findings.55 
IV.  THE FEDERAL APPROACH  
To fully understand the issue that was before the court in Di-
az, it is pertinent to discuss the impact of several notable Supreme 
Court cases that have shaped the Confrontation Clause analysis.  De-
spite having been abrogated by Crawford, a brief synopsis of the 
1980 Supreme Court decision Ohio v. Roberts56 is an appropriate 
starting point. 
In Roberts, the defendant was charged and convicted of for-
 
48 Id. 
49 892 N.E.2d 843 (N.Y. 2008). 
50 Id. at 846 (holding that an autopsy report was non-testimonial and thus admissible un-
der the business records exception to the hearsay rule). 
51 923 N.Y.S.2d 428 (App Div. 1st Dep’t 2011). 
52 See Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 429 (holding that an autopsy report was non-testimonial and 
its admission into evidence did not violate defendant‘s rights under the Confrontation 
Clause). 
53 918 N.E.2d 927 (N.Y. 2009). 
54 See Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 932 (holding that the court’s admission of a DNA report de-
spite not producing the technician who performed the testing did not violate defendant‘s 
rights under the confrontation clause). 
55 Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *5. 
56 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
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gery of a check and possession of stolen credit cards.57  The defend-
ant appealed and the Supreme Court of Ohio found that the use of the 
transcript from the preliminary trial, which included testimony from 
the defendant’s daughter, violated Roberts’ confrontation rights.58  
The court reasoned that the transcript should not have been intro-
duced because the defendant’s daughter had not been cross-examined 
at the preliminary hearing and did not appear at trial.59 
Roberts made its way up to the United States Supreme Court 
where the Court was faced with determining whether it was constitu-
tional to admit testimony from a preliminary hearing despite the wit-
ness not being produced at the defendant’s criminal trial.60  The Su-
preme Court held that the introduction of the daughter’s testimony 
from the defendant’s preliminary hearing did not offend the Confron-
tation Clause because it was “subjected to the equivalent of signifi-
cant cross-examination” and bore adequate “indicia of reliability.”61  
The Court explained that the test for determining sufficient “indicia 
of reliability” is one that either falls “within a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception” or bears “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”62 
In Crawford, the Supreme Court overturned the “indicia of re-
liability” framework established by Roberts,63 instituting a test based 
on a statement’s “testimoniality” instead.  In Crawford, the defendant 
was charged with assault and attempted murder for stabbing a man 
who allegedly tried to rape his wife, Silvia Crawford.64  In an effort to 
 
57 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58.  During Robert’s preliminary hearing, the defense called Ber-
nard Isaacs’ daughter, Anita Isaacs, as a witness who attested to the fact that she had given 
Roberts permission to reside in her apartment for several days while she was away.  Id.  
Anita denied all allegations made by the defense counsel that she had given Roberts permis-
sion to use her father’s checks and credit cards.  Id.  In addition to the defense counsel’s fail-
ure to request Anita be placed on cross-examination, the defense did not declare Anita as a 
hostile witness.  Id.  After the grand jury indicted Roberts on all charges, five subpoenas 
were issued to Anita but she failed to appear at the trial return date.  Id. at 59. 
58 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 59-60, 62. 
59 Id. at 61-62. 
60 Id. at 58. 
61 Id. at 78. 
62 Id. at 66. 
63 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (overturning the precedent established by Roberts and 
properly holding that “the State admitted Sylvia’s testimonial statement against petitioner, 
despite the fact that he had no opportunity to cross-examine her, alone is sufficient to make 
out a violation of the Sixth Amendment . . . we decline to mine the record in search of indi-
cia of reliability”). 
64 Id. at 38. 
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prove the defendant was not acting in self-defense, the State played 
the police recording of Sylvia’s account of the events in question.65  
Crawford was convicted but appealed his case to the Washington 
Court of Appeals, which reversed his conviction.66  However, on re-
view the Washington Supreme Court reversed and reinstated Craw-
ford’s conviction.67  The court reasoned that Sylvia Crawford’s 
statement satisfied the “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” 
standard set forth in Roberts.68  The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
and reversed the court’s decision.69 
Unlike Roberts, the main focus of the Crawford opinion out-
lined the historical background of the Confrontation Clause.70  Justice 
Scalia addressed the shortcomings of the Roberts opinion by pointing 
out that the “indicia of reliability” test was in conflict with two im-
portant principles.71  First, the purpose of the Confrontation Clause 
was to guard against the “use of ex parte examinations as evidence 
against the accused.”72  Scalia elaborated on this by stating that the 
aim of the Confrontation Clause is to bar the admission of testimonial 
hearsay and contended that the interrogations conducted by the police 
fell within that class.73  Second, the Framers were not of the opinion 
that the prior opportunity to cross-examine a witness was a disposi-
tive right.74  Rather, historical sources indicate that the “Framers 
would not have allowed the admission of testimonial statements of a 
witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testi-
fy and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-
 
65 Id.  The defendant did not have an opportunity to cross-examine his wife because her 
interrogation took place at the police station.  Id. at 65.  Sylvia Crawford did not testify be-
cause of marital privilege.  Id. at 40. 
66 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. (holding “although Sylvia’s statement did not fall under a firmly rooted hearsay ex-
ception, it bore guarantees of trustworthiness” because Sylvia’s statements and those made 
by the defendant appear to overlap). 
69 Id. at 42. 
70 Id. at 66 (recognizing how the Framer’s would react: “The Framers would be astounded 
to learn that ex parte testimony could be admitted against a criminal defendant because it 
was elicited by ‘neutral’ government officers”). 
71 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36. 
72 Id. at 36-37 (stating that the “Roberts test departs from historical principals because it 
admits statements consisting of ex parte testimony upon a mere reliability finding”). 
73 Id. at 36 (observing “[t]he Clause’s primary object is testimonial hearsay, and interroga-
tions by law enforcement officers fall squarely within that class”). 
74 Id. at 52. 
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examination.”75 
Crawford is also distinguishable from Roberts in that it 
stressed the importance of differentiating between non-testimonial 
and testimonial statements when facing Confrontation Clause is-
sues.76  While Justice Scalia did not provide an exhaustive definition 
of “testimonial,” he did give some insight as to the persons and types 
of evidence the clause was aimed at.77  Scalia observed that the Con-
frontation Clause is applicable to those who “bear testimony” against 
the accused.78  Furthermore, “[a]n accuser who makes a formal 
statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a 
person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.”79  
Moreover, Scalia provided an informal test for establishing the pres-
ence of a testimonial statement when he stated: “[S]tatements that 
[are] made under circumstances which would lead an objective wit-
ness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for 
use at a later trial” are considered testimonial.80  Under this test, ex-
amples of testimonial statements would include, but are not limited 
to, depositions, confessions, affidavits, custodial examinations and 
ex-parte-testimony.81 
Under this reasoning, the Supreme Court found the statements 
taken by the police officers while conducting their interrogation to be 
testimonial in nature82 and that the admission of such evidence vio-
lated the defendant’s right to confrontation because he did not have a 
prior opportunity to cross-examine his wife and she was unavailable 
 
75 Id. at 36 (“And the ‘right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him,’ is most 
naturally read as a reference to the common-law right of confrontation, admitting only those 
exceptions established at the time of the founding.”). 
76 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69, 71-72. 
77 Id. at 68. 
78 Id. at 51. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 52. 
81  
Various formulations of this core class of ‘testimonial’ statements exist: 
‘ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material 
such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the de-
fendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that 
declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially, . . . extra-
judicial statements contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as 
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony or confessions.’ 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52. 
82 Id. at 68. 
10
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to testify at trial.83  Crawford’s significant impact on the way courts 
assess issues involving the Confrontation Clause is two-fold: First, it 
abrogated the longstanding precedent established in Roberts.  Second, 
the opinion failed to provide a comprehensive definition of what con-
stitutes a “testimonial” statement, leaving courts treading in unchar-
tered seas.  However, in 2006, the Supreme Court provided some 
much needed clarity by introducing the “primary purpose” test set 
forth in Davis v. Washington as a way to distinguish testimonial and 
non-testimonial statements.84 
In Davis, the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of 
whether statements made during a recording of a 911 call were testi-
monial, and thus subject to the requirements of the Sixth Amend-
ment’s Confrontation Clause.85  The testimony in question, made by 
Michelle McCottry to a 911 operator, included statements in which 
McCotty identified and described a domestic dispute with her former 
boyfriend, Adrian Davis.86  The State introduced the 911 recording 
and the defense objected, contending that its admittance violated Da-
vis’s Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine McCottry.87  The trial 
court allowed the State to play the recording for the jury and Davis 
was eventually convicted.88  Both the Washington Court of Appeals 
and the Supreme Court of Washington upheld Davis’s conviction, 
finding the 911 conversation identifying Davis as the assailant to be 
non-testimonial.89 
The Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that McCottry’s state-
ments made to the 911 operator, while the defendant was still within 
the vicinity and in violation of a no-contact order, were not testimo-
nial, and therefore not subject to the Confrontation Clause.90  The 
Court reasoned, “Statements are nontestimonial [sic] when made in 
the course of a police interrogation under circumstances objectively 
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable 
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”91  In contrast, 
 
83 Id. at 68-69. 
84 Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
85 Id. at 817. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 819. 
88 Id. 
89 Davis, 547 U.S. at 819. 
90 Id. at 829. 
91 Id. at 822. 
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statements should be considered testimonial “when the circumstances 
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that 
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past 
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”92 
In the Davis opinion, the Supreme Court distinguished the tes-
timonial statements made in Crawford from the non-testimonial 
statements at issue in Davis.93  For example, in Davis, the statements 
in question were made by the victim as the events were happening in 
real time,94 whereas the statements made by Crawford’s wife took 
place several hours after the stabbing occurred.95  Second, the Davis 
statements elicited by the 911 call were “necessary to enable the po-
lice to resolve the present emergency, rather than simply learn . . . 
what had happened in the past,” which was the case in Crawford.96  
Lastly, the Court pointed out the distinct difference in the level of 
formality in the way the absentee witnesses answered questions in the 
respective cases.97  In Crawford, the defendant’s wife “was respond-
ing calmly, at the station house, to a series of questions, with the of-
ficer-interrogator taping and making notes of her answers.”98  The 
circumstances in Davis were strikingly less formal where the victim 
frantically answered questions prompted by a 911 operator while she 
remained in an unsafe and hostile environment.99  For these reasons, 
the Court in Davis felt McCottry was not acting as a witness for pur-
poses of a criminal investigation.100 
Three years after Davis, the Supreme Court provided even 
more insight when it decided Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.  
There, the defendant was charged with trafficking and distributing 
cocaine.101  The State introduced certificates authored by state labora-
 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 827 (“The difference between the interrogations in Davis and the one in Crawford 
is apparent on the face of things.”). 
94 Davis, 547 U.S. at 827. 
95 See id. (comparing statements made by complainant in Davis versus statements in ques-
tion in Crawford). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id.  
99 Davis, 547 U.S. at 827 (“McCottry’s frantic answers were provided over the phone, in 
an environment that was not tranquil, or even . . . safe.”). 
100 Id. at 828 (holding “that the circumstances of McCottry’s interrogation objectively in-
dicate its primary purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency”). 
101 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 308. 
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tory analysts indicating the presence of cocaine from seized evi-
dence.102  Despite the analysts not testifying at trial, the trial court al-
lowed the certificates to be admitted and the defendant was convict-
ed.103  On appeal, the defendant argued that the admission of the 
certificates violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the wit-
nesses against him.104  Relying on the precedent established by Craw-
ford, the defense asserted that the prosecution’s use of the certificates 
was contingent upon the analysts testifying in person at the defend-
ant’s trial.105 
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Melendez-Diaz and 
found there to be “no Crawford exception” that would allow the in-
troduction of affidavits comprised of forensic analysis for the purpose 
of proving the defendant was in possession of cocaine, where the af-
fiants did not testify at trial.106  The Court relied on the “primary pur-
pose” test in finding that the certificates were testimonial, reasoning 
that the affidavits were being used to prove or establish historical 
events relevant to a criminal trial expected to take place in the fu-
ture.107  It is important to note that the majority explicitly rejected the 
respondent’s comparison of the affidavits to the business records ad-
missible at common law.108  However, the majority elaborated on the 
use of business records and stated that “[d]ocuments kept in the regu-
lar course of business may ordinarily be admitted at trial despite their 
hearsay status,”109 although the Court was quick to add that “th[is] is 
not the case if the regularly conducted business activity is the produc-
tion of evidence for use at a trial.”110 
 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 309. 
104 Id.  The Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether affidavits by analysts at a 
state lab, attesting that the substance analyzed was cocaine, were testimonial rendering the 
affiants “witnesses” subject to the defendant’s right of confrontation under the Sixth 
Amendment.  Id. at 307. 
105 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 309 (“Petitioner objected to the admission of the certifi-
cates asserting our Confrontation Clause decision in Crawford v. Washington, required the 
analysts to testify in person.”). 
106 Id. at 311. 
107 Id. (ruling that if an out of court statement is being used to prove an event  previously 
occurred then it is subject to the Confrontation Clause). 
108 Id. at 321. 
109 Id. 
110 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 321.  See Palmer v. Hofmann, 318 U.S. 109, 114 (1943) 
(holding that an accident report made by an employee of a railroad company did not qualify 
as a business record because, although kept in the regular course of the railroad’s operations, 
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Another noteworthy Supreme Court case elaborating on the 
term “ongoing emergency” with respect to the primary purpose test is 
Michigan v. Bryant.111  In Bryant, the Court faced the issue of wheth-
er the Confrontation Clause barred the admission of statements made 
at a crime-scene by a mortally wounded victim that identified and de-
scribed the location and identity of his assailant.112  The Court held 
that the circumstances of the interaction between the victim and the 
police, viewed from an objective standpoint, indicated that the prima-
ry purpose of the interrogation was to enable the police to put an end 
to an ongoing emergency.113 
In its analysis, the Court recognized that the primary purpose 
test was an objective one and stressed the importance of what reason-
able participants would have ascertained having encountered the situ-
ation in question.114  In essence, the circumstances, including the 
statements and actions of the parties involved, should be evaluated as 
they appear at the time and not with the benefit of hindsight.115 
The Court also stressed the importance of a victim’s medical 
condition for purposes of determining the primary purpose of a police 
interrogation.116  Although the Court in Bryant disagreed with the 
Michigan Supreme Court’s finding that all statements made by a fa-
tally injured victim during police questioning at a crime scene should 
be found non-testimonial, it did recognize a victim’s mental state to 
be a significant factor in the primary purpose inquiry.117  The Court 
 
it was “calculated for use essentially in the court, not in the business”). 
111 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
112 Id. at 1150.  The victim was shot by Bryant on Bryant’s property but managed to drive 
himself to a nearby parking lot where police found him and questioned him.  Id. 
113 Id.  Therefore, the admission of the victim’s statements at trial did not violate the de-
fendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront his witness.  Id. 
114 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156 (“[T]he relevant inquiry into the parties' statements and ac-
tions is not the subjective or actual purpose of the particular parties, but the purpose  reason-
able participants would have had, as ascertained from the parties’ statements and actions and 
the circumstances in which the encounter occurred.”). 
115 Id. at n.8.  When evaluating the existence of an ongoing emergency, the Court said that 
the focus is on the participant’s statements as a means to end the threatening situation, not on 
“proving past events potentially relevant to later criminal investigation.”  Id. at 1157. 
116 Id. at 1148 (“A victim’s medical condition is important to the primary purpose inquiry 
to the extent that it sheds light on the victim’s ability to have any purpose at all in responding 
to police questions and the likelihood that any such purpose statement would be a testimonial 
one.”). 
117 Id. at 1159 (“Taking into account the victim’s medical state does not, as the Michigan 
Supreme Court below thought, ‘rende[r] non-testimonial . . . all statements made while the 
police are questioning a seriously injured complainant.’ ”). 
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observed: 
The medical condition of the victim is important to the 
primary purpose inquiry to the extent that it sheds 
light on the ability of the victim to have any purpose at 
all in responding to police questions and on the likeli-
hood that any purpose formed would necessarily be a 
testimonial one.118 
Furthermore, the Court warned that circumstances surrounding an 
ongoing emergency can evolve from non-testimonial to testimoni-
al.119  For example, in situations where a victim is interrogated by po-
lice officers in order to provide emergency assistance and the vic-
tim’s assailant who posed a threat to the public is no longer at large, 
then statements made by the victim could be deemed testimonial.120 
The Supreme Court recently faced a similar issue to the one it 
faced in Melendez-Diaz.  In Bullcoming v. New Mexico,121 the de-
fendant was charged with driving while intoxicated.122  The prosecu-
tion sought to introduce a sample containing the defendant’s blood 
alcohol as evidence at trial.123  However, the analyst that conducted 
the report did not appear at trial;124 instead, the prosecution called an-
other analyst to attest to the sample despite the fact that this analyst 
did not actually observe the testing of the defendant’s blood sam-
ple.125  The trial court allowed the introduction of the sample finding 
that it qualified as a business record, and the defendant was thereafter 
convicted.126  The defendant appealed and the case made its way to 
the New Mexico Supreme Court, which relied on the holding from 
Melendez-Diaz.127  The court ruled that the report containing the de-
 
118 Bryant, 131 S.Ct. at 1159 (holding “the victim’s medical state also provides important 
context for first responders to judge the existence and magnitude of a continuing threat to the 
victim, themselves and the public”).  Id. 
119 See Davis, 547 U.S. at 828 (“That is not to say that a conversation which begins as an 
interrogation to determine the need for emergency assistance cannot . . . ‘evolve into testi-
monial statements.’ ”). 
120 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1159. 
121 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
122 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2709. 
123 Id. at 2710. 
124 Id. at 2711-12. 
125 Id. at 2712.  The defense objected to the use of this evidence arguing that it violated 
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront his witness.  Id. 
126 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2712. 
127 Id. at 2712. 
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fendant’s blood alcohol concentration was testimonial, but nonethe-
less permitted the prosecution to introduce it into evidence.128  This 
holding was clearly at odds with Crawford because the New Mexico 
Supreme Court admitted the testimonial evidence even though the fo-
rensic analyst was unavailable at trial.129  Furthermore, there was no 
indication that the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine 
the forensic analyst.130 
The Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether 
the Confrontation Clause allows a forensic analyst to testify to a lab 
report that he did not conduct or observe and was conducted for the 
purpose of proving a particular fact in a criminal trial.131  The Court 
held that the forensic analyst’s testimony made on behalf of the ana-
lyst who actually conducted the analysis did not comport with the 
Confrontation Clause.132  The Supreme Court rejected the reasoning 
applied by the New Mexico Supreme Court and reiterated the rule es-
tablished by Crawford.133 
The Court observed that the analyst who actually performed 
the test was in effect certifying more than a machine-generated num-
ber.134  The analyst who executed the report certified that he had re-
ceived the defendant’s blood sample “with the seal unbroken, that he 
checked to make sure that the forensic report number and the sample 
number ‘corresponded,’ and that he performed on Bullcoming’s sam-
ple a particular test, adhering to precise protocol.”135  The absent fo-
rensic analyst also attested to the fact that the sample had not been 
manipulated.136  The Supreme Court ruled that because the testifying 
analyst could neither confirm nor deny what the absentee analyst ob-
 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 2713. 
130 Id. at 2714. 
131 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710. 
132 Id. (holding that “the accused’s right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the 
certification, unless that analyst is unavailable, and the accused had an opportunity, pretrial, 
to cross-examine particular scientist”).  Id. 
133 Id. at 2713 (“[If] an out of court statement is testimonial in nature, it may not be intro-
duced against the accused at trial unless the witness who made the statement is unavailable 
and the accused has had a prior opportunity to confront that witness.”).  Id. 
134 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715. 
135 Id. at 2714. 
136 Id. (“[H]e further represented, by leaving the ‘remarks’ section of the report blank, that 
no ‘circumstance or condition . . . affected the integrity of the sample . . . or the validity of 
the analysis.’ ”). 
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served, the defendant was not afforded a fair opportunity to cross ex-
amine.137  Furthermore, had the performing analyst been made avail-
able at Bullcoming’s trial, the defense would have had an opportunity 
to undermine his credibility by questioning why he had been placed 
on unpaid leave and to inquire as to whether he performed the tests 
according to the precise protocols.138 
V.  NEW YORK APPROACH  
New York courts have expanded upon the definitions of tes-
timonial statements provided by the Supreme Court, following a ru-
bric set forth in People v. Rawlins.139  Rawlins illustrated the Court of 
Appeals’ use of the “indicia of testimoniality,” including: 
(1) [T]he extent to which the entity conducting the 
procedure is “an ‘arm’ of law enforcement”; (2) 
whether the contents of the report are a contempora-
neous record of objective fact, or reflect the exercise 
of “fallible human judgment”; (3) the question, closely 
related to the previous two, of whether a pro-law en-
forcement bias is likely to influence the contents of the 
report; and (4) whether the report’s contents are “di-
rectly accusatory” in the sense they explicitly link the 
defendant to the crime.140 
The Court of Appeals applied these factors in Rawlins where 
a fingerprint analysis was the evidence at issue.141  The prosecution 
introduced a report, which included the defendant’s fingerprints and 
fingerprints lifted from the scenes of six burglaries.142  Only one of 
the two analysts who performed the comparison testified at trial.143  
And this analyst concluded that the prints sampled from the crime 
scenes matched the defendant’s.144  Using the “indicia of 
 
137 Id. at 2715. 
138 Id. 
139 884 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 2008). 
140 Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d at 845-46 (quoting Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1030-31 (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted)). 
141 Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1033. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 1023. 
144 Id. 
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testimoniality,” the court deemed the fingerprint comparison to be 
prepared “solely for prosecutorial purposes and, most importantly, 
because they were accusatory and offered to establish the defendant’s 
identity,” thus touching upon the fourth prong.145  In addition, the 
first indicia was also satisfied because police department analysts, 
who fall within the category of law enforcement personnel, produced 
the evidence.146  Lastly, the fingerprints taken from the scene of the 
burglary in question matched the defendant’s, thus linking him to the 
burglary.147  In light of this, the court in Rawlins ruled that the finger-
print analysis was testimonial and the defendant was therefore enti-
tled to confront his accusers.148 
In the context of hospital and medical reports specifically, 
most indicia will not apply.  For example, medical professionals such 
as doctors and nurses are the ones scribing information of patients, 
and neither are generally considered an arm of law enforcement.  Al-
so, without more information, it is likely that no pro-law enforcement 
bias will influence the hospital staff to alter the report.  Most at issue 
is the fourth prong, where patients are more likely to identify some-
one who physically or sexually assaulted them or inflicted any other 
harm upon them.  But while Crawford and its progeny and Rawlins 
have provided frameworks for deciding testimonial evidence subject 
to the Confrontation Clause, there is no federal precedent that ad-
dresses the testimonial nature of hospital records.  In contrast, New 
York courts have been faced with deciding whether a defendant’s 
confrontation rights are implicated by the admittance of physician 
records on a number of occasions.149 
A recent Court of Appeals case, People v. Duhs,150 illustrated 
New York’s usage of the primary purpose test with respect to a doc-
tor’s testimony concerning a child’s statement made during an exam-
ination.151  In Duhs, the defendant allegedly placed his girlfriend’s 
 
145 Id. at 1033. 
146 Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1023. 
147 Id. at 1033. 
148 Id. 
149 See, e.g., People v. Duhs, 947 N.E.2d 617, 618 (N.Y. 2011) (holding that a physician’s 
testimony concerning a child’s statement made during an examination that was absent from 
the hospital record to be non-testimonial because it was necessary to the child’s medical di-
agnosis and treatment). 
150 947 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 2011). 
151 Duhs, 947 N.E.2d at 619-20. 
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child in a bathtub filled with boiling water resulting in the child suf-
fering third degree burns.152  At trial, the prosecution called upon the 
doctor, who examined the child as a witness.153  The doctor testified 
to an exchange that occurred between himself and the patient that 
was not included in the medical records.154  The defendant objected, 
arguing that his right to confront the witnesses against him was vio-
lated by allowing the doctor to testify to a conversation he had with 
the child.155  The State contended that this statement was not subject 
to the Confrontation Clause because it was non-testimonial.156  The 
State’s argument was based on the primary purpose test, which indi-
cated that the purpose of the doctor’s question was to determine the 
cause of the injury and apply the appropriate treatment, not to elicit 
facts or other information to be used later at trial.157  The Court of 
Appeals agreed and affirmed the lower court’s holding that the state-
ment in question was non-testimonial.158 
The court reasoned that the child’s statement indicating that 
his mother’s boyfriend prevented him from getting out of a tub filled 
with boiling water was not testimonial because the primary purpose 
of the physician’s inquiry was to establish the cause of the accident to 
render adequate aid.159  Additionally, the court also recognized that 
the Supreme Court has already stated that “ ‘statements to physicians 
in the course of receiving treatment would be excluded, if at all, only 
by hearsay rules’ and not the Confrontation Clause.”160  Because the 
doctor’s first and foremost duty was to offer medical assistance to a 
child, and not to obtain information relevant to a future prosecution, 
the court concluded that the child’s statement “was germane to his 
medical diagnosis and treatment,” and therefore was properly admit-
ted under the medical treatment hearsay exception.”161 
 
152 Id. at 618. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. (referring to when the doctor asked the child why he did not get out of the tub and 
the child said “he wouldn’t let me out”). 
155 Id. at 619. 
156 Duhs, 947 N.E.2d at 619. 
157 Id. at 619-20. 
158 Id. at 620. 
159 Id. at 619-20. 
160 Id. at 620 (quoting Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376 (2008)). 
161 Duhs, 947 N.E.2d at 618.  The Court of Appeals relied on Davidson v. Cornell, 30 
N.E. 573, 576 (N.Y. 1892), which observed the unique circumstances where a patient is 
seeking medical attention and “there is a strong inducement for the patient to speak truly of 
 
19
Barlow: Confrontation Clause Concerns
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
1418 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
The Court of Appeals faced another similar situation involv-
ing medical records in People v. Ortega.  There, the court also al-
lowed the prosecution to introduce hospital records, though the only 
difference between this case and Duhs was that the statements were 
admitted under a different hearsay exception.162  Ortega provided the 
rule that the admissibility of a victim’s medical records under the 
business records exception hinges on whether the statement at issue is 
relevant to diagnosis and treatment.163 
The complainant in Ortega was taken to the hospital after a 
physical altercation with her boyfriend.164  Once there, she informed 
the medical personnel that her older boyfriend used a belt to strangle 
her.165  The attending physician marked in the victim’s report that she 
suffered from “domestic violence and asphyxiation.”166  While some 
information from the hospital report was redacted at the behest of the 
defense counsel, the information concerning references to domestic 
violence and the description of the weapon were permitted to be in-
troduced at trial.167  The defendant was convicted of assault and ap-
pealed, but the Appellate Division affirmed, “finding that it was a 
proper exercise of discretion for the court to allow limited references 
in medical records and testimony to the effect that complainant ‘was 
diagnosed as having been subjected to domestic violence involving a 
former boyfriend,’ as those references were relevant to the proposed 
treatment.”168 
The Court of Appeals affirmed, going into depth on the trust-
worthiness of hospital records with respect to criminal trials.169  The 
court observed that hospital records are reliable because they reflect 
the human emotion to report the facts as they truly occurred, and also 
 
his pains and sufferings . . . .”  Id.  Therefore statements that are made by a patient describ-
ing his “present condition are permitted to be given as evidence only when made a physician 
for the purposes of treatment.”  Id. 
162 Ortega, 942 N.E.2d at 216. 
163 Id. at 211.  The court will admit hospital records under the business records exception 
when they “reflect acts, occurrences, or events that relate to diagnosis, prognosis or treat-
ment or are otherwise helpful to an understanding of the medical or surgical aspects of the 
particular patient’s hospitalization.”  Id. at 214. 
164 Id. at 212. 
165 Id. 
166 Ortega, 942 N.E.2d at 212. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 213. 
169 Id. at 214. 
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because they are designed to be referred to in moments of life and 
death.170  Accordingly, hospital records fall within the business rec-
ords exception when the information contained in them is useful for 
understanding the aspects of a patient’s hospitalization, including the 
events leading up to hospitalization, diagnosis, and prognosis.171 
As examples, the court cited to Williams v. Alexander172 and 
People v. Greenlee.173  In Williams, the plaintiff was involved in a car 
accident and told the attending physician that a car struck another car 
which propelled itself into his vehicle.174  The court determined that 
this statement focused primarily on how the accident occurred rather 
than on providing information relevant to diagnosis or treatment, and 
thus rendered the statement inadmissible as a business record.175  In 
contrast, the statement of a woman to a doctor claiming that she was 
threatened by her former boyfriend was relevant in order to formulate 
a discharge plan to ensure her safety.176  These cases reiterate the rule 
that the inquiry regarding a statement’s admissibility is whether the 
statement is relevant to a patient’s diagnosis or treatment.177  The 
court held that because instances of domestic violence require treat-
ment plans different from other types of assaults due to the intimate 
relationship and living conditions of the parties, admitting the refer-
ences to domestic violence and a safety discharge plan in the hospital 
records were not improper.178 
VI.  CONSISTENCY IN THE FACE OF NEW YORK AND FEDERAL 
PRECEDENT  
A.  Is Diaz Consistent with New York Precedent? 
The court in Diaz was correct in finding that the hospital re-
 
170 Id. 
171 Ortega, 942 N.E.2d at 214. 
172 129 N.E.2d 417 (N.Y. 1955). 
173 70 A.D.3d 966 (App. Div. 2nd Dep’t 2010). 
174 Williams, 129 N.E.2d. at 418. 
175 Id. at 420. 
176 Greenlee, 70 A.D.3d at 967. 
177 Ortega, 942 N.E.2d at 215. 
178 Id. 
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port was non-testimonial in nature179 and is consistent with Duhs and 
its progeny.180  Based on Duhs, the court in Diaz deemed the hospital 
report to be non-testimonial because the report included statements 
made by the patient to the doctor, which were germane her diagnosis 
and treatment.181  The Diaz opinion is also consistent with New 
York’s position with respect to admitting hospital records under the 
business records exception.182  Not surprisingly, the business records 
requirement is noticeably similar to the standard used to determine 
the testimonial nature of hospital records.183  The court, in citing to 
Ortega, stated that “hospital records [are] admissible under the busi-
ness records exception when they reflect acts or events that relate to 
diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment.”184 
The testifying doctor stated that “the record of the complain-
ant’s stay at Whitestone Hospital was kept in regular course of busi-
ness,”185 and it is assumed that it is within the hospital’s regular 
course of business to prepare such reports because whenever a patient 
is admitted to a hospital their condition and treatment is documented.  
For these reasons, the court in Diaz was correct in finding the hospi-
tal records admissible under the business records exception.186 
At first glance it could be argued that the defendant posed a 
valid argument when he asserted that the hospital records were anal-
ogous to the forensic reports in Melendez.187  The opinion does not 
elaborate on the basis of his argument, but there are several recog-
nizable similarities.  First, a hospital record can be used in the same 
manner as a forensic report.188  For example, both can be used to dis-
pel or prove a fact in the prosecution’s case.189  In the Diaz case, the 
 
179 Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *5. 
180 Id. at *4. 
181 Id. at *4-5. 
182 Id. at *5. 
183 Id. at *4. 
184 Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *4. 
185 Id. at *2. 
186 Id. at *5. 
187 Id. 
188 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324 (“[T]he analysts’ statements here prepared specifically 
for use at petitioner’s trial were testimony against petitioner, and the analysts were subject to 
confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.”). 
189 See id. at 311 (utilizing the “primary purpose” test in finding that the forensic reports 
indicating the presence of cocaine seized from evidence constituted testimonial evidence, 
reasoning that the certified reports were being used to prove or establish historical events 
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complainant sought medical care from her physician after being 
raped.190  Generally, when a patient has endured a rape there are cer-
tain medical procedures performed by medical personnel to deter-
mine the physical damage caused,191 often referred to as a “rape 
kit.”192  The purpose of the rape kit is to preserve physical evidence 
following a sexual assault, which can subsequently be used in a rape 
investigation.193  The rape kit is then sent to law enforcement for 
DNA testing.194  In essence, the rape kit is the first step in the forensic 
analysis.  Assuming a rape kit was actually performed in Diaz and the 
results were sent for DNA testing, it is likely that this information 
would have been included in the complainant’s hospital record.  The 
results of the rape kit could then be used to prove the prosecution’s 
case, which supports the argument that the report was prepared in an-
ticipation of litigation and thus testimonial.195  Moreover, if the hospi-
tal record was deemed testimonial, then the hospital resident would 
have been a “witness” for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.196 
However, the court in Diaz did not go into much detail with 
respect to how much reliance the doctor placed on the hospital re-
ports or whether or not the doctor was familiar with the hospital’s 
procedures.197  Instead, the Diaz opinion merely stated that the doctor 
reviewed the hospital record and that he signed the record because he 
agreed with the resident’s notations.198 Furthermore, Diaz’s conten-
tion that his situation was analogous to that in Melendez-Diaz falls 
short because, unlike the analysts in Melendez-Diaz, the doctor in his 
 
relevant to a criminal trial expected to take place in the future). 
190 Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *2-*3.  Recall that the complainant was then admitted to 
the hospital where she was treated by a hospital resident who made notations in her hospital 
record as to his observations.  Id. at *1.  Dr. Fuchs then testified to his own examinations of 
the complainant and to the hospital record of the complainant’s stay.  Id. at *2. 
191 Jill E. Daly, Gathering Dust on the Evidence Shelves of the United States—Rape Vic-
tims and Their Rape Kits: Do Rape Victims Have Recourse Against State and Federal Jus-
tice Systems?, 25 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 17, 21 (2003). 
192 N.Y. CRIM. LAW § 6:64 (McKinney 2011). 
193 Daly, supra note 191, at 21. 
194 Id. at *5. 
195 Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *5. 
196 Compare id. (ruling that the hospital report contained statements from non-testifying 
persons), with Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311-12 (“The forensic reports certifying the pres-
ence of cocaine, are comparable to ‘live in-court testimony, doing precisely what a witness 
does on direct examination.’ ”). 
197 Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 932. 
198 Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *2. 
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case actually treated and diagnosed the complainant.199 
The trend among New York cases is that the defendant rarely 
has the opportunity to confront the analysts or doctors who actually 
prepare the reports being used against him or her at trial because such 
evidence is regularly deemed non-testimonial.200  Notice that the New 
York Court of Appeals has already ruled hospital reports, forensic re-
ports, autopsy reports, and DNA reports containing the results of a 
rape kit, to be non-testimonial in nature.201  Essentially, New York 
courts find that raw factual data does not implicate Confrontation 
Clause concerns.  New York’s pro-non-testimonial view is distin-
guishable from the Supreme Court, which has consistently found fo-
rensic reports to be testimonial in nature and subject to the Confron-
tation Clause.202 
B.  If the Supreme Court Hears the Hospital Records 
Issue, How Will it Decide? 
The Supreme Court’s strict approach to the Confrontation 
Clause is distinguishable from the New York Court of Appeals.  Fed-
eral precedent demonstrates the Supreme Court’s position on preserv-
ing the defendant’s constitutional right to confront his or her witness.  
Perhaps that is why the Court is cautious in its determinations of what 
evidence is deemed testimonial. 
As previously noted, the United States Supreme Court has not 
been faced with the issue of deciding whether a hospital report is 
considered testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.  But 
based on Crawford and its progeny, there is some indication that the 
Court might come to a finding similar to that of the forensic reports 
in Melendez-Diaz.203  Similar to the forensic reports in Melendez-
 
199 Id. 
200 Duhs, 947 N.E. 2d at 619-20.  See also People v. Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d 428 (2011) (find-
ing that the autopsy report was properly admitted as business record despite fact that medical 
examiner who created report did not testify); People v. Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d 843 (N.Y. 
2008) (factual portions of autopsy report were not testimonial and could be introduced as a 
business record without doctor who performed autopsy); People v. Brown, 918 N.E.2d 927 
(N.Y. 2008) (holding DNA report containing “raw data” admitted as business record despite 
fact that analyst who prepared report did not testify). 
201 Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *5. 
202 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311; Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710. 
203 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310 (“There is little doubt that the documents at issue in 
this case fall within the core clause of testimonial statements [described in Crawford.]”). 
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Diaz, the Court would likely find hospital reports susceptible to ma-
nipulation.204  For example, when a patient is being observed in a 
hospital, their chart is accessible to a number of nurses, doctors, and 
medical students who may make notations as they see fit.205  While 
hospital records include notations as to machine-generated data, e.g., 
vitals, heart rate, etc., they also include subjective observations of the 
patient’s condition.206  These subjective observations include the pa-
tient’s physical appearance, statements made by the patient to the 
physician, and the patient’s mental state.207  This argument is compa-
rable to the reasoning set forth in Bullcoming.208 
In light of the Supreme Court’s strict adherence to preserving 
a defendant’s right to confront their accusers, it is unlikely that the 
Court would admit any record containing subjective observations 
through the testimony of a surrogate witness.  The rationale behind 
this was addressed in Bullcoming.  Like the analyst in Bullcoming, 
the doctor in Diaz was not only attesting to raw data but rather the 
condition of the complainant based on the perspective of other hospi-
tal employees.209  It is one thing to account for one’s own medical 
expertise, but it is quite another to testify to the knowledge and expe-
rience of others.  This is especially dangerous because doctors often 
have different opinions regarding treatment options and can misdiag-
nose.  Moreover, like the testifying analyst in Bullcoming, the doctor 
in Diaz could neither confirm nor deny what the absentee hospital 
resident observed during his analysis.210  This in turn did not give Di-
az a fair opportunity to cross-examine.211  For these reasons, it is un-
 
204 Id. at 318 (“Forensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of manipula-
tion.”). 
205 Id. at 320 (“At the time of trial, petitioner did not know what tests the analysts per-
formed, whether those tests were routine, and whether interpreting their results required the 
exercise of judgment or the use of skills that the analysts may not have had.”). 
206 Mark R. Bower, Providing a Separate Cause of Action in Malpractice Cases, for Vio-
lation of the Federal “Anti-Dumping” Act, N.Y. ST. B. J. 34, 35 (1994). 
207 Id. 
208 See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2714 (recognizing that “[t]hese representations, relating 
to past events and human actions not revealed in raw, machine-produced data, are meant for 
cross-examination”). 
209 Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *2. 
210 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715 (“But surrogate testimony of the kind [the surrogate 
analyst] was equipped to give could not convey what [the absentee analyst] knew or ob-
served about the events his certification concerned, i.e., the particular test and testing process 
he employed.”). 
211 Id. at 2716 (“Accordingly, the Clause does not tolerate dispensing with confrontation 
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likely that the Supreme Court would declare a hospital report non-
testimonial because of the probability that it contains subjective ob-
servations. 
On the other hand, if the Supreme Court adopted Bryant’s “on 
going emergency” approach in assessing the testimonial nature of 
hospital records, it would find such records to be non-testimonial in 
certain situations.212  The circumstances surrounding an ongoing 
emergency are similar to those when a complainant makes a state-
ment to their doctor for purposes of seeking medical treatment.213  
For example, when a physician makes inquiries to his patient’s condi-
tion, those statements made by the patient are for the purpose of sus-
taining human life and not in anticipation of a criminal trial.214  The 
Court would apply the same factors as it did in Bryant.215  Under the 
Bryant analysis, it would evaluate whether the victim is stable versus 
whether the victim is fatally wounded and is conscious of his or her 
condition.  Similar to that of the police officer in Bryant whose job is 
to diminish the threat, the doctor’s job is to stabilize his patient.216 
Due to the overwhelming likelihood that any hospital report 
would include subjective observations, it is improbable that the Court 
would apply the “on going emergency” standard if there were a sur-
rogate witness testifying to such report.  In light of this, and the argu-
able similarities shared between forensic reports and hospital records, 
the Supreme Court would adopt the same reasoning as they did in 
Melendez-Diaz or Bullcoming. 
VII.  CONCLUSION  
In conclusion, the Diaz opinion is clearly consistent with New 
York precedent established by Duhs and the cases that followed.  
New York’s position with respect to the testimonial nature of hospital 
records and forensic reports is clearly at odds with the federal ap-
 
simply because the court believes that questioning one witness about another’s testimonial 
statements provides a fair enough opportunity for cross-examination.”). 
212 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1147-48. 
213 Id. at 1148 (“A victim’s medical condition is important to the primary purpose inquiry 
to the extent that it sheds light on the victim’s ability to have any purpose at all in responding 
to police questions and on the likelihood that any such purpose would be a testimonial 
one.”). 
214 Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *5. 
215 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1162. 
216 Id. at 1159. 
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proach.  New York infringes on the Sixth Amendment rights of de-
fendants by being too relaxed in its rendering of hospital records and 
forensic reports as non-testimonial, thereby not giving defendants an 
opportunity to confront their accusers. 
Based on the Court’s decisions in Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming, the Supreme Court would likely consider hospital rec-
ords to constitute testimonial evidence within the scope of the Con-
frontation Clause.  Federal precedent has made it abundantly clear 
that a defendant’s right to confront his accuser is not a dispositive 
right and therefore it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would render 
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